Attackers apparently from China exploited an authentication security weakness in Optimizely, a popular AI platform used by marketers, to compromise at least 178 websites owned by some of the world's largest companies. Named victims included vendors such as Zoom, Paychex, Equifax and GitLab, and end-user enterprises including Starbucks, IKEA, Mattel, American Eagle, Air France, Mutual of Omaha, Heineken, Home Chef, Cinnabon, Levi, Costco and HSBC. Salesforce confirmed it had also been affected, stating it was investigating unauthorized modifications to Optimizely scripts used on certain of its websites and had disabled Optimizely scripts across preview and production instances as a precaution.
The attacks were discovered by Scott Helme, a UK-based security researcher and founder of Report URI, whose team directly observed 178 victims carrying the same infection, though he said there could be more. Helme published a report on Monday describing how an Optimizely capability in its Web Experimentation product, which facilitates adding members to a site's development team, was leveraged to insert malware into the sites. Optimizely, which did not respond to an interview request, confirmed the attacks on its site and said in an email to customers that the attackers had targeted them.S1S2
According to the report, customers load a JavaScript snippet from Optimizely's content delivery network containing Optimizely code, their A/B tests and an optional Project JavaScript field for custom code. The attackers inserted their own code into that Project JavaScript field and left the rest of the snippet untouched, so the file was still served from Optimizely's domain with its certificate, from a host every affected site already trusted. Helme described the malware as a multi-purpose kit that swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits.S1S2
The card-skimming component watched form submissions and POST requests for card numbers, expiry dates and security codes, sending them to an external address once all three were captured. Cards entered in hosted payment frames from providers such as Stripe and Adyen were out of its reach, but cards typed into a site's own form fields were not. Helme warned that trusted JavaScript does not always remain trustworthy, noting that a website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached.S1S2